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INTRODUCTORY NOTE TO DECISION OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON THE APPLICATION FOR
ANNULMENT OF THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC
BY CHIARA GIORGETTI*
[September 25, 2007]
+Cite as 46 ILM 1132 (2007)+

The Ad Hoc Committee on the Application for Annulment of the Argentina Republic ("Argentina") delivered its
decision to the Parties September 25, 2007. The Committee upholds Argentina's application for annulment on the
umbrella clause, but dismisses all other claims.
The request for annulment of the Award dated 12 May 2005 rendered by the Tribunal in the arbitration between
CMS Gas Transmission Company ("CMS") and the Republic of Argentina ("the Award")' was filed with the
Secretary-General of the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes ("ICSID") by Argentina
almost exactly two years earlier, on September 8, 2005.
In accordance with Art. 52(3) of the Arbitration Rules, the Chairman of the Administrative Council appointed the
Ad Hoc Committee (the Committee), which was composed of Judge Gilbert Guillaume (France, President), Judge
Nabil Elarby (Egypt) and Professor James R. Crawford (Australia), all renowned experts in international public law.
The 2005 Award was the first to be decided in relation to Argentina's economic crisis of 2001-2002, and the
annulment decision is likewise the first to apply the limited grounds for review afforded by Article 52(1) of the
ICSID Convention to an Award on this matter. 2 Given that many decisions based on very similar legal issues are
pending or have been recently decided, the annulment decision is particularly important. In fact, the Committee
itself remarked that, because the arbitration at issue was the first of a long series relating to the Argentine crisis,
it would "seek to clarify certain points of substance on which, in its view, the Tribunal made manifest errors of
law." 3 Manifest errors of law are not, however, grounds for annulment of an Award, and in fact the Committee
to be seen, whether as a consequence [of the finding on manifest error of law] the award
noted that "it remain[ed]
' 4
should be annulled.
The main facts of the dispute are not complex. 5 In the nineties, Argentina privatized its gas industry and regulated
the transport and distribution of natural gas. The State monopoly for the transportation and distribution of gas was
divided into several companies, including Transportadora de Gas del Norte (TGN). In 1992, TNG was granted a
license to transport gas in Argentina. By 1999, CMS Gas Argentina, a wholly owned subsidiary of CMS, a US
company, had acquired a total of 29.42% shares in TNG. Gas tariffs were to be calculated in dollars, conversion
to pesos to be effected at the time of billing, and tariffs adjusted every six months in accordance with the US
Producer Price Index (US-PPI).
In 2001, Argentina declared a public emergency. This terminated the rights of licenses of public utilities to calculate
tariffs in dollars and to periodically adjust them based on an US based index. Tariffs were redenominated in pesos
at one peso to one dollar rate.
Interestingly, CMS had initially filed a case with ICSID in relation to the application of the US-PPI to tariffs of
the gas industry under the BIT between US and Argentina (the Treaty).6 However, it extended its claims to cover
by Argentina to address the economic crisis, and the Tribunal held it had jurisdiction over the
the measures taken
7
entire dispute.
The Tribunal issued its Award in May 2005, and rejected CMS's claims of expropriation under Article IV of the
Treaty and of discrimination and arbitrary treatment under Article II(2)(b). It also ruled that Argentina had breached
the fair and equitable treatment clause in Article II(2)(a) of the Treaty and had failed to observe the obligations
entered into with regards to the investment guaranteed in Article II(2)(c) of the Treaty. The Tribunal also rejected
Argentina's state of necessity defense under both international customary law and Art. XI of the Treaty. As a
result, the Tribunal awarded CMS compensation of US$133.2.million The Tribunal also directed CMS to transfer
the ownerships of its shares in8 TNG to Argentina upon payment of the compensation and an additional sum of
more than two million dollars.
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Argentina's request for annulment alleged several defects in the Tribunal's findings, and namely on those relating
to fair and equitable treatment (Art. II(2)(a) 9 , the umbrella clause (Art. II(2)(c)),10 necessity under the Treaty
(Art. XI)11 and under customary international law, and in the calculation of damages. Argentina invoked the
Tribunal's excess of power (Art. 52(b)) 12 and failure to state reasons (Art. 52(e)) as grounds of annulment for the
defects. 13
Citing the Vivendi and MTD Tribunals, the Committee's prefaced its decision underlining the limited grounds for
an ICSID Annulment, which can extinguish a res judicata, but cannot create a new one on the merit.1 4 Further,
in assessing Argentina's submission, the Committee noted that manifest excess of power included both jurisdictional
errors and a complete failure to apply the law, but distinguished between failure to apply the law and error in its
application. 15
The decision of the Committee is particularly interesting on two issuesrespects. First, the Committee disagreed
with the Tribunal's conclusions that Argentina was in breach of the umbrella clause in Art. II(2)(c). Argentina
argued that neither it nor any of its instrumentalities had assumed any obligations towards CMS beyond the Treaty
itself, but that its obligations were towards TGN. Thus, the Claimant could no invoke any obligation under the
umbrella clause. CMS asserted that its claim was based on a breach of the assurances given it as regards to the
tariffs, and not on the breach of TGN's tariffs rights as such. The Committee sided with Argentina and found that
it was unclear how the Tribunal had arrived to its conclusions that CMS could enforce the obligations of Argentina
to the TNG. The Committee held the Award had a significant lacuna which made it impossible for the reader to
follow the reasoning and annulled the Tribunal's finding on Article II(2)(c) for failure to state reasons. However,
the Committee concluded that its conclusion would not have an impact on the decision
on damages was made on
16
the basis of independent findings of breach of Article II(2)(a) and (c) of the Treaty.
On similar facts and based upon the same umbrella clause, other tribunals, including Enron and Sempra, had
reached the same conclusion of the CMS Tribunal.' 7 The award in Sempra is not yet res judicata, and ilt will be
interesting to see whether the Committee's decision will prompt a request for annulment from Argentina.
A second interesting conclusion of the Committee pertains to the necessity plea. In CMS, Argentina had claimed
that in the event that the Tribunal concluded that there had been a breach of the Treaty, it should be exempt from
liability in light of the existences of a state of necessity or state of emergency under both international customary
law and Art. XI of the Treaty. The Tribunal had found that Art. 25 of the Articles of.the ILC on State Responsibility generally considered as reflecting customary law - set strict conditions for the applicability of the necessity plea,
which had to be cumulatively satisfied. 18 These conditions were not met by Argentina, in part because Argentina.
had contributed to the creation of the emergency and because the measures taken to address the crisis were not
the only steps available. 19 The Tribunal also expressed doubts as to whether "an essential interest" of the State
was involved and whether there was "a grave and imminent" peril to such interest. 20 The Tribunal also found
21
that Art. XI was not self-judging and a substantial review was necessary.
In the annulment proceedings, Argentina had claimed that the Tribunal had wrongly conflated the Article XI
arguments and the necessity argument and failed to distinguish between treaty and customary law. The Committee
partially agreed with Argentina's view and found that the Tribunal had failed to provide reasons for its decision
under Article XI. In the eyes of the Committee, the Tribunal should have specified that the same reasons that
disqualified Argentina from relying on the general law of necessity also barred it from applying Art. XI. The
Committee however concluded that a careful reader could follow the implicit reasoning of the Tribunal22 (and in
any case that the Parties understood the Award). It therefore rejected Argentina's claim for annulment.
The Committee, however, found that the Tribunal had made several errors of law when examining necessity. First,
the Tribunal had mistakenly applied the same four conditions of the state of necessity under international customary
law to the Treaty provision. However, the two provisions are different both in terms of operation and content.
The Tribunal had also made a second error of law because it should have taken a position on the relationship
between customary and Treaty law and decide whether both were applicable, rather than assuming that Article
XI and Art. 25 were on the same footing. To the Committee, Art. 25 could only be subsidiary to the exclusion
23
based on Article XI. The Committee concluded that the Tribunal had given an erroneous interpretation to Article XI.
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However, given the limitations of Art. 52 of the Convention, the Committee again found that no manifest excess
of power was found. It concluded that the Tribunal applied Art. XI of the Treaty, although it did so cryptically
and defectively, and that it could not substitute its interpretation to the one of the Tribunal.24
Finally, the Committee found another manifest error of law in the Tribunal's findings on the temporary character
of necessity and consequences for compensation. The Committee held that the Tribunal should have considered
what would have been the possibility of compensation under the Treaty if the measures taken by Argentina had
been covered by Art. XI. The Committee considered that Art. XI would have excluded the operation of the
substantive provisions of the Treaty and thus eliminate the possibility of compensation being payable during that
period.25 These conclusions, however, would have not altered the finding of the Tribunal. The Committee concluded
that there was no manifest excess of power or lack of reasoning in the part of the Award concerning Art. XI of
the BIT and state of necessity under international customary law.
The remarks of the Committee that it found errors of law must be read within the Committee's initial proviso that
it would "seek to clarify certain point of substance" 26 in the Award, regardless of their consequence on the Award.
Moreover, the Committee's interpretation of the relationship between treaty and customary law for the necessity
plea will inform subsequent Tribunal and Committee's interpretation. Given that many other cases with similar
legal questions and factual patterns are pending, the Committee's view on the matter is likely to be of consequence.
On the other issues at stake in the case, the Committee upheld the conclusion of the Tribunal on the issue of jus
standing of CMS and found that the applicable jurisdictional provisions were only those of the ICSID Convention
and the Treaty, and that Argentina's law was irrelevant. The Treaty covered investments made by minority
shareholders, and thus CMS had to be considered an investor within the meaning of CMS so that itsclaims were
within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.27
The Committee also asscertained Argentina's claims on fair and equitable treatment under Art. II(2)(a) of the
Treaty and disagreed with Argentina's contention that the Tribunal had given investors an enforceable expectation
of total stability in the economy of the host State. The Committee concluded that the Award was adequately
that it had no jurisdiction to control the interpretation given
founded on the applicable law and
28 relevant facts and
Article.
that
to
Tribunal
by the
Finally, on the issue of damages, the Committee concluded that the Award was one of the most detailed decisions
on damages in ICSID case-law and rejected Argentina's contention that the Tribunal had failed to state reasons
in that respect.29
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